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abStract
If we assume that all sentient animals deserve equal moral consideration and, therefore, that 
their interests are morally relevant, what should be our attitude regarding natural pheno-
mena like predation or starvation which are harmful for many wild animals? Do we have 
the prima facie moral obligation to try to mitigate unnecessary, avoidable and unjustified 
animal suffering in nature? In this paper I assume two main theses: (1) Humans and (many) 
animals deserve equal moral consideration; this implies that (2) We have the prima facie 
moral obligation to try to mitigate unnecessary, avoidable and unjustified animal suffering. 
Based on these assumptions, I argue that we are morally obligated to aid animals in the wild 
whenever doing so would not originate as much or more suffering than it would prevent.
Keywords: moral consideration of animals, wild animals, intervention in nature, 
predation, environmentalism, animal suffering, moral agency, special obligations, 
natural selection, argument from species overlap.
1. introduction
Do we have the prima facie moral obligation to try to mitigate unnecessary, 
avoidable and unjustified animal suffering? In this paper I will argue that 
we do and, additionally, that this moral obligation implies the duty of inter-
vening in nature for the sake of the interests of individual wild animals, 
with the aim of sparing them the sufferings they would otherwise endure. 
 1 The author would like to thank Oscar Horta and Catia Faria for their helpful com-
ments on an earlier draft of this paper.
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I will proceed as follows. Firstly, I will present some theses which I will 
simply assume as a starting point. Secondly, I will present what I consider 
to be the eight main arguments against human intervention in nature with 
the aim of preventing the suffering of wild animals  2, and I will argue that 
they do not work.
2. Starting point aSSumptionS
The main thesis I will assume affirms that many animals deserve certain 
kind of moral consideration and, at least all the sentient ones, are worthy of 
moral consideration in the same way that human beings are  3.
In turn, this assumption is based on other assumptions. I believe that 
if we assume some basic moral principles like the “principle of equality” 
(all human beings are worthy of the same moral consideration), the “prin-
ciple of relevance” (only if there is a morally relevant difference between 
the members of two groups can a difference in the entitlements of the 
members of those two groups be justified), and the “principle of desert” 
(nobody should be blamed or praised for things that are beyond their con-
trol), these principles offer us a good base to elaborate a sound argument in 
favor of the equal moral consideration of all sentient animals. I presuppose 
 2 There is another very important argument that has been raised against interven-
tion in nature on behalf of animals: the argument from absurdity. The argument runs as 
follows (Sapontzis 1984, 27; 1987, 229): First premise. Moral agents are morally obligated 
to alleviate unnecessary, avoidable and unjustified animal suffering – Second premise. Ani-
mals suffer when they are preyed upon by predators – First conclusion. Moral agents are 
morally obligated to forestall predation – Third premise. But, clearly, a moral obligation to 
halt predation is absurd – Second conclusion. Therefore, contrary to the first conclusion, 
moral agents are not obligated to alleviate unnecessary, avoidable and unjustified animal 
suffering. Advocates of this argument are, for instance, Sagoff (1984, 41-2) and Cohen 
(2001, 30). The main problem of the argument is that the third premise is disputable. 
Since this argument has been impeccably analyzed by Sapontzis (1984; 1987, 229-48), 
I will not consider it in this paper. I agree with Sapontzis when he concludes that the 
obligation to intervene in nature on behalf of animals is not absurd when we adopt the 
following principle: Moral agents are morally obligated to forestall predation whenever 
doing so would not originate as much or more suffering than it would prevent.
 3 A being deserves moral consideration if legitimate moral constraints apply to our 
treatment of it. Moral consideration can be direct or indirect. On the one hand, a being 
deserves direct moral consideration if moral agents have the duty of taking into account 
the well-being of that creature when they take moral decisions. On the other hand, a being 
deserves indirect moral consideration if moral agents do not have the direct duty of taking 
into account its well-being, but must consider how the treatment of that being affects the 
well-being of the individuals who deserve direct moral consideration.
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that these three basic moral principles are valid. Additionally, based on the 
argument from species overlap, I assume that there are no morally relevant 
differences between humans and animals  4.
Of course, all these assumptions are debatable and, although I believe 
there are good arguments to support them, in this paper I will not try to 
argue in favor of them. I will just take them for granted.
3. Eight argumEntS againSt intErvEntion in naturE
 on bEhalf of animalS
Unless there were independent reasons to deny equal moral consideration 
to wild animals, the previous assumptions apply to wild animals as well 
as to domesticated ones. The concession of equal moral consideration to 
sentient wild animals leads to the problem of the moral evaluation of pre-
dation  5. Animals constantly kill other animals in wild environments. If we, 
as moral agents, have the moral obligation to regulate our own behavior 
towards animals, should not we have the obligation to regulate how ani-
mals treat each other also (Cowen 2003, 169)?
In what follows, I will defend that, in many cases, it is our duty to inter-
vene in nature to regulate how animals treat each other. With this aim in 
mind, I propose one thesis and one moral principle  6:
The interventionist thesis: Moral agents have the prima facie moral obligation 
of intervening in nature with the aim of protecting individual animals from 
unnecessary, avoidable and unjustified sufferings.
The interventionist principle: Moral agents are morally obligated to forestall 
predation whenever doing so would not originate as much or more suffering 
than it would prevent.
I will examine and criticize what I believe are the eight main arguments 
that have been presented against the interventionist thesis and the interven-
tionist principle. I will conclude that all of them face significant problems 
and, therefore, that they are unsatisfactory.
 4 For an illuminating justification of the equal moral consideration of humans and 
animals based on these basic moral principles see Rowlands 2002, 26-57; 2009, 8-30.
 5 Although throughout the paper I will refer mainly to the issue of predation, I am 
convinced that the conclusions drawn are valid regarding other problems such as starva-
tion or natural catastrophes.
 6 The thesis and moral principle presented here are directly linked with the ideas of 
Sapontzis (1984; 1987, 229-39).
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3.1. The argument from bad consequences
Singer (1973; [1975] 2002, 225-8)  7, Rowlands (2009, 168-70) and Simmons 
(2009, 22-5) appeal to the argument from bad consequences to justify that 
we should leave wild animals alone. The main reasons they offer to refuse 
intervention are based on the disastrous consequences it would supposedly 
cause: starvation, overpopulation, the extinction of some animal and plant 
species, etc.
In spite of the fact that they base their arguments in different theoreti-
cal frameworks, we can summarize and simplify the argument they use as 
follows:
 1. First premise: Actions are right in so far as they produce good conse-
quences and wrong in so far as they bring about bad ones.
 2. Second premise: Intervening in nature would cause bad consequences.
 3. Conclusion: Therefore, intervening in nature is a morally wrong action.
The first thing we should note is that these authors do not show that inter-
vention will necessarily have disastrous consequences; they simply take the 
truth of the second premise for granted. Perhaps it is a reasonable belief but 
some empirical data to support the assertion would be more than welcome. 
In any case, for the sake of the argument, I will accept that a widespread 
intervention in nature would have bad consequences. Does this invalidate 
the interventionist thesis? I do not think so. To put it simply, the interven-
tionist principle escapes from the critique of the argument from bad conse-
quences. If we have the duty to forestall predation only when doing so does 
not cause as much or more suffering than it would prevent, we do not have 
the duty to prevent predation in those cases in which intervention would 
have disastrous consequences. The interventionist principle avoids from the 
beginning the problems posed by the argument from bad consequences.
Someone might hold that the interventionist principle presents an 
empty obligation because there are no cases in which preventing predation 
would not originate as much or more suffering than it would prevent. Nev-
ertheless, this is not the case (Sapontzis 1984, 31; 1987, 234). For instance, 
if we accepted the principle, we would have the obligation to impede that 
our pets become predators.
To sum up, the interventionist principle eludes the objections of the 
argument from bad consequences and, therefore, it offers us a good base to 
support the interventionist thesis.
 7 To be fair, Singer (1973; [1975] 2002, 226) stands for a restricted intervention-
ist position, provided that we were able to calculate reliably the general consequences of 
policing nature.
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3.2. The argument from the lack of agency
Appealing to the fact that animals are not moral agents, Regan (1983, 357) 
explicitly denies that we should intervene in nature with the aim of prevent-
ing the rights violations that happen there. He claims that, since animals 
are not moral agents, they do not have moral duties. Hence, animals do not 
have the duty to respect the rights of other animals, including their right 
to life. This way, while human hunt would be immoral (because humans 
are normally moral agents), animal predation would not pose any moral 
problem (because animals are not moral agents). When there are no moral 
agents involved, there are no moral issues to deal with.
Why are similar harms morally significant in some cases but not in 
others? Regan’s argument implicitly implies that only when an action is 
performed by a moral agent possesses that action moral weight. When 
there are no moral agents involved, consequences are neutral. The argu-
ment runs as follows:
 1. First premise: Only when an action is performed by a moral agent does 
that action possess moral weight.
 2. Second premise: Animals are not moral agents.
 3. Conclusion: Therefore, predation between animals has no moral weight.
Regan’s thesis that the harm animals cause each other is not morally sig-
nificant because they are not moral agents is highly implausible. It requires 
that only when a moral agent consciously and deliberately decides to inflict 
harm is that harm morally significant. If the same harm was caused by a 
moral patient, since moral patients do not have the duty to respect other’s 
rights, that harm would not be morally relevant. But this viewpoint is 
extremely counterintuitive. We all normally admit that an action performed 
by a moral patient can be morally wrong and, therefore, that actions made 
by moral patients are not always morally neutral. For instance, would we 
say that we should not intervene if a dog bit a human baby because neither 
is a moral agent and, therefore, because the consequences of the action are 
morally neutral? While the assumption that only moral agents can make 
morally significant choices is reasonable, the thesis that only when moral 
agents are involved are the consequences morally significant is hard to 
accept.
Apart from that, Regan’s response to the predation problem is inap-
propriate for various other reasons. First of all, Regan’s answer misses the 
point. Nobody is saying that animals have the moral duty to respect the 
rights of other animals. The point is to decide if we, moral agents, have 
the duty to intervene in nature to impede animals harming each other. 
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Therefore, to answer that animals are not moral agents and that, hence, 
there is no moral problem in predation is to refute a straw man. Of course, 
the attribution of moral agency to an individual is important to settle 
responsibility and punishment issues but it does not affect the rightness 
or wrongness of the harm itself (Sapontzis 1987, 231; Cowen 2003, 176-7; 
Nussbaum 2006, 379)  8.
Leaving aside that Regan’s answer misses the point, his position faces 
other considerable problems. Firstly, it is usually accepted that rights hold-
ers have the right to see their rights protected wherever the damage comes 
from. For example, we help people harmed by hurricanes and earthquakes, 
and we think they have the right to be assisted by the state, despite hur-
ricanes and earthquakes not being moral agents. Secondly, Regan’s thesis 
is openly against our everyday intuitions; should we refrain from inter-
vening in all the cases in which neither attacker nor attacked were moral 
agents? Were that the case, we would not have the duty to intervene when 
a dog attacked a human baby. This conclusion is against common-sense 
intuitions. Thirdly, it seems to be a contradiction between the traits that, 
according to Regan, inherent value possesses and the normative thesis that 
recommends not intervening in nature. In Regan’s (1983, 236-7) theory, 
individuals who possess inherent value possess it equally; inherent value 
does not admit varying degrees. Furthermore, inherent value is not gained 
or reduced depending on the actions that inherently valuable individuals 
perform. Therefore, if all individuals who possess inherent value deserve 
respectful treatment, and the principle of respect for individuals establishes 
that animals have the right to be assisted by moral agents whenever their 
rights are violated, then, how can Regan justify that humans do not have 
the duty to intervene in nature to prevent predation? To justify why some 
animals – domesticated animals, mainly – have the right to be assisted while 
others – wild animals – do not, we would need to postulate that inher-
ent value and rights are context dependent. Unfortunately, Regan’s theo-
retical commitments regarding inherent value do not allow him to support 
this thesis. This is not surprising: since individuals who possess inherent 
value possess it equally, and since inherent value is not gained or reduced 
depending on the actions that inherently valuable individuals perform or 
the degree to which they have utility with respect to the interests of others 
(Regan 1983, 237), it would be unacceptable to declare that inherent value 
changes depending on the context.
 8 This thesis presupposes that together with agent-dependent dimensions like 
motives and emotions, there are also agent-independent reasons that we should take into 
account in our moral evaluations; e.g., the consequences of actions.
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Briefly, Regan holds two opposing views. On the one hand, animals 
have the right to receive assistance from moral agents. On the other hand, 
moral agents should not intervene in nature to prevent rights violations 
between animals. Trying to fit together these two conflicting claims, Regan 
presents the argument from the lack of agency. Unfortunately, this argu-
ment is untenable.
3.3. The argument from ignorance
This is an argument formulated in passing by Simmons (2009, 23). Taking 
into account that we do not still know very well how ecological relations 
work, it would be dangerous and naïve to suppose that we have enough 
knowledge to modify natural ecological relations without causing serious 
problems. We are not able to predict accurately the effects that preventing 
predation would have for humans, animals and ecosystems. Nevertheless, 
we know that intervention would clearly modify ecological relations and, in 
all probability, due to our lack of adequate knowledge, it would also cause 
severe harms to animals. Thus, because of the insufficiency of our current 
expertise, we must refrain from preventing predation.
We should note first that this argument is only applicable against some 
forms of intervention, that is, interventions with considerable probabilities of 
triggering ecological catastrophes (Cowen 2003, 179). If we could measure 
reasonably well their consequences, modest interventions would be morally 
acceptable. In addition, although it seems that Simmons’ argument implicitly 
assumes it, it is important to observe that not all human caused disturbances 
in nature are blameworthy (Cowen 2003, 180). Disturbing nature might 
be morally justified if the consequences were good enough. The argument 
from ignorance does not explain why ecological balance should always be 
the prevailing value. Furthermore, since change and instability are common 
phenomena in nature, it is not clear how we should define an ecological 
catastrophe (Cowen 2003, 180). Finally, our lack of knowledge and the pos-
sibility of a natural disaster does not necessarily imply that we should not 
intervene in nature more than it implies that we should (Cowen 2003, 181). 
After all, uncertainty affects equally the interventionist and the anti-interven-
tionist theses; it neither supports nor opposes intervention as such. If we are 
not able to predict accurately the effects that intervention in nature would 
have, we are probably not able to predict the consequences of not interven-
ing either. Were this correct, the argument from ignorance could be based 
on the “status quo bias”, an inappropriate and irrational preference for an 
option because it preserves the status quo (Bostrom and Ord 2006, 658).
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3.4. The environmentalist argument
Environmental ethics, unlike mainstream animal ethics theories, concedes 
direct moral consideration to natural entities which do not have the sub-
jective capacity to suffer (Callicott 1980, 31-3). While the viewpoint of 
ecocentrism is holistic, animal ethics views are atomistic and, unlike animal 
ethics theories, environmental ethics does not rely on a hierarchical onto-
logical and axiological scheme, it relies on a functional system of value 
(Callicott 1980, 38). Environmental ethics framework is holistic because 
its main focuses of concern are ecosystems, not individuals. Consequently, 
Callicott (1980, 39) claims that a thing is right when it tends to preserve 
the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community, and it is wrong 
when it tends otherwise  9. Environmental ethics relies on a functional 
system of value because it does not ascertain value distinctions based on a 
fixed higher/lower order of being. On the contrary, it ascertains value dis-
tinctions based on the contextual functional importance individuals have 
in preserving ecosystems. In this respect, a bacterium can deserve higher 
moral consideration than a dog if it contributes more to the integrity, sta-
bility and beauty of the biotic community.
In line with the ideas presented above, environmental ethics holds that 
the moral consideration of individual animals is contextually dependent (Cal-
licott 1980, 47). Animals who make notable contributions to the preservation 
of ecosystems are worthy of higher moral consideration than those who do 
not. That being so, the moral consideration of an individual wild animal will 
depend on the contribution it makes to the preservation of the ecosystem. 
Therefore, we would only have the duty of helping a wild animal in need 
when doing so helped to preserve an ecosystem. If we acknowledged that 
intervention in nature to prevent predation would not contribute to preserve 
the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community, we would arrive 
at the conclusion that intervention is immoral. Moreover, due to the critically 
important role they play in preserving many ecosystems, we should concede 
higher moral consideration to predators than to prey (Callicott 1980, 39).
Portrayed in this way, the environmentalist argument is untenable. 
First of all, the extreme holistic moral standpoint Callicott defends is arbi-
trary (Sapontzis 1987, 261-4). It is perhaps acceptable that a fraction of 
an individual’s value is determined by his role in an ecosystem. Perhaps 
it is even acceptable that, in some circumstances, the overall good of the 
ecosystem should prevail over the good of an individual and, therefore, the 
 9 As he openly recognizes, embracing this moral principle Callicott is directly follow-
ing Aldo Leopold’s land ethic (Leopold 1949).
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good of the ecosystem is sometimes an adequate criterion to resolve con-
flicts of interests. But it is difficult to accept that the moral consideration 
of an individual is completely determined by the role she or he plays in an 
ecosystem. It is difficult to accept because it implies that it is legitimate to 
use some individuals as mere means to promote, in this case, the alleged 
integrity, stability and beauty of nature. More importantly, adopting the 
extreme individualism vs. radical holism dichotomous perspective, Calli-
cott presents a false dilemma. There are tolerable intermediate positions 
and an interventionist animal ethics does not have any problem in embrac-
ing them. Additionally, Callicott defends environmental ethical holism 
because he believes it presents a viable way of adjudicating conflicts of 
interests. But this claim is valid also for many moral principles and it does 
not necessarily entail that the moral principle at issue is acceptable.
Callicott (1980, 53-5) believes that, due to its value commitments, 
animal ethics is a world-denying philosophy. We should accept nature and 
life as they are, with all their hardships and all their joys. This means that 
we should accept that in nature some beings live at the expense of others: 
“If nature as a whole is good, then pain and death are also good” (Callicott 
1980, 54). We should not impose artificial human values on nature; just the 
opposite, we should assert natural biological laws. This proposal has practi-
cal consequences which are hard to endorse (Sapontzis 1987, 264). By way 
of illustration, when Callicott mentions we should accept life and nature as 
they are, he states that in the favored good old days when tribalism reigned 
“[…] animal flesh was respectfully consumed; a tolerance for pain was cul-
tivated; virtue and magnanimity were prized; lithic, floral, and faunal spirits 
were worshipped; population was routinely optimized by sexual continence, 
abortion, infanticide, and stylized warfare” (Callicott 1980, 54). If the 
practical implications of Callicott’s stance are adoration of floral and faunal 
spirits, infanticide and stylized warfare, his argument is difficult to accept.
To conclude, we have good reasons to reject Callicott’s charge of 
animal ethics being a world-denying philosophy. If all moral theories which 
do not accept life and nature as they are should be labelled as “world-deny-
ing”, then, the vast majority of moral theories are world-denying. Some of 
the widely accepted main goals of morality are to inhibit natural desires 
and to propose and fight for a better world. The unconditional approval 
of the current state of affairs would only be morally correct if we lived in 
the best of the possible worlds. As I am afraid (and hope) that this is not 
the case, to be anti-natural and world-denying is not immoral; quite on the 
contrary, morality requires a positive world changing attitude (Sapontzis 
1987, 267-8). Thus, ultimately, I conclude that we have good reasons to 
reject the environmentalist objection against the interventionist thesis.
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3.5. The argument from natural selection
Predation is one of the reasonable candidates to be listed as a disvalue in 
nature (Rolston 1992, 253-5). Predation is indisputably bad for prey: it 
makes them suffer and, in many cases, the final result is death. Neverthe-
less, disvalue for prey is a value to predators. From the general perspec-
tive of ecosystems and evolution, there is not so much a loss of value in 
predation as value transference: a life is lost to make possible the survival of 
other. Even at the level of subjective experiences, Rolston thinks predation 
is well-adjusted: the pains of prey are counterbalanced by the pleasures of 
predators. At this point, Rolston takes under consideration the negative 
consequences that preventing predation would probably have: “An Earth 
with only herbivores and no omnivores or carnivores would be impover-
ished” (1992, 254). Since he believes that biological goodness, the degree 
to which ecosystems are pro-life and prolific, is a relevant aspect to evaluate 
natural processes, he concludes that the impoverishment that preventing 
predation would cause is not desirable. It is important to emphasize that 
preventing predation could impoverish not only ecosystems but the capaci-
ties of animals too. The tendency to complexity predation promotes is not 
only beneficial to predators, prey also gain in the process by acquiring more 
complex and higher capabilities by means of evolution. Hence, although 
predation is a disvalue for individual prey, it can be valuable for prey spe-
cies because it promotes the development of better perceptual, physical 
and cognitive skills in the long-term. Eradicating the weakest members of a 
species, natural selection promotes the fitness of the individual members of 
a species in the long-run. When we adopt a standpoint based on the long-
term benefits of natural selection, the disvalue of predation is transformed 
into value.
Rolston (1992, 252) acknowledges that biological goodness per se is not 
necessarily morally valuable. Diversity, complexity, fortitude through strug-
gle, etc., are simply natural creative activities, not moral ones. However, we 
may have good reasons to see them as morally important, especially if we 
do not exclusively tie moral value to the subjective psychological experi-
ences of individuals. Insofar as biological complexity is the necessary pre-
condition of the subjective psychological experiences to which we attach 
value, we should value and protect it too (Rolston 1992, 275). Thus value 
is not only tied to subjective psychological experiences such as pleasure or 
pain but it is also tied to biological processes like predation.
The main problem with the argument from natural selection is that 
it inappropriately mixes up two different issues: the welfare of individual 
animals and the general capacities of a species. As is perfectly clear in the 
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human case, the policies and traits that maximize the well-being of individ-
uals are not necessarily the ones that maximize the improvement, diffusion 
and reproduction of their genetic material. Natural selection and individual 
welfare are distinct issues. Since I consider sentience to be a necessary 
and sufficient condition to deserve full and equal moral consideration, 
forasmuch as species are not sentient beings I think morality should focus 
primarily on the welfare of individuals and not on the improvement of the 
capacities of a species. The improvement of biological fitness and the sur-
vival capacities of a species can be morally important indeed, but it should 
play a minor role in morality compared with individual welfare. Despite 
this, at least in some cases, prey may actually benefit from the existence 
of predators: predators may keep down overpopulation, improving the 
quality of life of prey (Cowen 2003, 172-3). However, even in those cases 
it is clear that predatory activities are not always beneficial to some prey. 
Finally, it is relevant to emphasize that generally, due to the harsh practi-
cal consequences it would have, we would not accept the argument from 
natural selection when applied to humans. Perhaps continuously fighting 
to survive would be good for us as a species, maybe it would improve our 
capacities in the long-term but, nevertheless, mainstream moral theories 
tend to promote compassion and empathy towards the weakest, not insen-
sitivity and repudiation. This is somewhat positive, I believe. The argument 
from species overlap is helpful here. If all humans deserve the same moral 
consideration, and if animals deserve the same moral consideration as 
marginal humans, then, if we consider the argument from natural selec-
tion unacceptable when applied to marginal humans, we should consider it 
unacceptable in the case of animals too.
I conclude that, because of the aforementioned problems, the argu-
ment from natural selection is problematic and we should not endorse it.
3.6. The argument from different moral obligations
DeGrazia (1996, 274-8), Scruton (2000, 79-122), Simmons (2009, 22), 
and Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011, 156-209) hold that, due to the per-
sonal or historical relations we have with domesticated animals, we have 
positive moral duties of care towards them that we do not have towards 
wild ones. So, due to the special relationships we have with them, we owe 
positive special obligations of care to some subset of animals, in contrast 
to the negative obligations we owe to all animals insofar as they are sen-
tient beings. Therefore, although we have the duty to protect domesticated 
animals from the attacks of predators, we do not have the duty to protect 
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prey from predators in the wild, because we do not have positive special 
obligations of care in the second case  10. The right to be protected from 
predators is a right acquired by domesticated animals through some type of 
special relationship with moral agents. Since wild animals do not normally 
have special relations with moral agents, they do not have the right to be 
protected from the attacks of predators. The main premise of the argument 
from different moral obligations says that special relations create and imply 
special moral duties.
I think that to determine the moral consideration of animals we should 
focus mainly in some morally relevant capacities of the individuals, not so 
much on the relations those individuals have with moral agents. Conse-
quently, I think it is extremely problematic to ascribe moral consideration 
based mainly on relations instead of individual capacities. In any case, the 
main problem of the argument is that the argument from species overlap 
applies equally to individual capacities and relationships. Hence, for every 
affective relation X which we consider morally relevant to determine moral 
consideration, we will find some humans as well as some animals which 
do not have that relationship with moral agents  11. This would implausibly 
imply that these humans and animals deserve lower moral consideration 
than those who have special relationships with us. Special relations perhaps 
ground special duties of care but they do not diminish the moral consid-
eration of beings which do not have those relationships with us. Animals 
with similar morally relevant basic individual capacities should merit simi-
lar moral consideration, regardless of the relations they have with moral 
agents. Moral consideration derives mainly from capacities, not relations.
In principle, I agree to the idea that we have special moral obligations 
towards domestic animals as the result of the specific particular/histori-
cal relationships we have with them. What I find harder to consent to is 
the idea that we do not have the moral obligation to intervene in nature 
because we do not have special particular or historical relationships with 
wild animals. It is likely that we owe more to those animals closer to us but 
this does not mean we owe nothing to wild animals. The key issue here is if 
we consider our obligation to intervene, and duties of assistance in general, 
as common universal moral obligations or, on the contrary, as particular 
 10 To be fair, many of these authors claim that, in some particular and well-defined 
situations, we have the duty to prevent predation in the wild as well, but they maintain 
that, on the whole, we do not have the duty to intervene in nature on behalf of wild ani-
mals.
 11 Perhaps the argument from species overlap is not applicable in the case of his-
torical relations but, obviously, the moral importance of historical relations and the duties 
they allegedly impose is controversial.
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special obligations. In the case of human beings, we would probably reject 
that we only have the moral obligation to assist those humans who have a 
special relationship with us. It is doubtful that we must consider the right 
to be assisted when harmed by predators a relational right in the human 
case. Why should this be different in the case of animals? Were that the 
case, we would not have the obligation to help human victims of predation 
if they did not have a special relationship with us. Perhaps we do not have 
the duty to assist people or animals in those circumstances but, consider-
ing the counterintuitive severe practical consequences the denial of these 
duties would have, I assume the ball is in the court of those who deny the 
existence of universal duties of assistance  12.
3.7. The argument from naturalness or “nothing wrong”
From time to time, an author appeals to the naturalness of predation to 
conclude that, inasmuch as predation is a natural phenomenon, there can 
be nothing wrong with it. Hettinger (1994, 17-8), for instance, says that 
intervening in nature to prevent predation implies a betrayal of natural 
values and abhorrence of natural processes. Predators are carnivorous; 
when they predate they are simply following their nature so it is nonsensical 
to claim that predation is morally wrong. They are predators, it cannot be 
wrong for them to predate. Therefore, when we disapprove of predation, 
we are opposing nature. To embrace natural values and value positively 
natural processes, we should accept that animal predation is good (but 
we could still consider human predation morally unjustifiable) (Hettinger 
1994, 18).
In the first place, it is important to admit that it is by no mean easy to 
determine what is natural and what is not. In our current world, humans 
permanently interact with nature, affecting and altering it. For example, 
when humans introduce animals from a certain species into an ecosystem 
where no animal of that species used to live before, should we define the 
predatory activity of that species as natural? It is not clear. On the one 
 12 Ebert and Machan (2012, 154-5) outline a promising libertarian conception of 
animal rights that would imply that we would not have the duty to assist animals by means 
of preventing predation. They reject that moral rights are necessarily positive and negative 
and they claim that, if animals had only negative rights, then, we would not have the moral 
obligation to assist them when harmed by predation. According to them, each moral agent 
should assume duties of assistance depending on his particular feelings/beliefs. Although 
I find this libertarian conception of animal rights interesting, it is still underdeveloped 
and, therefore, I will set it aside in this paper.
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hand, if we defined natural phenomena as those processes completely 
unconditioned by human influence, the predatory activity of invasive spe-
cies introduced by humans would be unnatural and, therefore, immoral 
in consonance with the argument. On the other hand, if we accepted that 
human influence does not disqualify a process from being natural, the 
opponents of intervention should offer us a sound argument of why inter-
vention would be immoral despite it being natural.
Besides, as Fink (2005, 4-5) notes, the argument is based on the general 
moral principle that if some animals are by nature carnivorous, nothing 
wrong happens when those animals kill others for food. So the argument 
takes for granted that to live following the dictates of nature is good but, 
undoubtedly, this principle is questionable. There is no logical connection 
between natural behaviors and morally correct ones: natural acts can be 
immoral and moral acts can be unnatural (Fink 2005, 5). Additionally, 
the argument from naturalness seems to presuppose that we should value 
positively all and every aspect of nature, but this thesis is implausible. As 
Everett (2001, 55-62) remarks, the negative evaluation of the suffering 
caused by predation does not mean necessarily the rejection of natural 
values and processes. We can see certain aspects of nature as morally bad 
without completely condemning or repudiating it. Moreover, it is reason-
able to consider the compassionate human response towards prey and the 
desire to help them as natural as well (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011, 166). 
Finally, we should note that it is not the same to claim that predators are 
acting immorally and to claim that predation is immoral. If we accept that 
there are agent independent reasons which can make an action good or 
bad, then we are capable of defending at the same time that predators are 
not acting immorally and that predation is morally wrong. Therefore, it is 
not nonsensical to defend that predation is wrong.
Taking into account all these considerations, I conclude that the sup-
posed naturalness of an action is difficult to define and, more importantly, 
it is irrelevant when trying to determine if an action is morally right or 
wrong. Therefore, the argument from naturalness is unsound.
3.8. The argument from virtue
Based on virtue ethics, Hursthouse (2011, 131-3) considers intervention in 
nature on behalf of animals immoral. She backs up her argument appealing 
to the virtue of respectful love.
Hursthouse (2011, 131) claims that the virtue of compassion is a spe-
cific form of the virtue of love. Since the primary concern of love is the 
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good or well-being of others, and in view of the fact that freedom from 
suffering is the central concern of compassion and a key element of the 
good or well-being of any sentient creature, compassion must be seen as 
a particular form of the virtue of love. In any case, she emphasizes that 
the virtue of love needs to be tempered with the virtue of respect, result-
ing in the virtue of respectful love (Hursthouse 2011, 132). Respectful love 
honors the right that others have to make their own choices, even in the 
cases in which we judge that their choices are harmful for their own good 
or well-being. Respectful love is, in the end, a corrective to the vice of arro-
gant paternalism. Our respectful love for animals should be based on, and 
informed by, “our recognition of the ways in which their needs and their 
lives are their own, peculiar to the sorts of animals they are” (Hursthouse 
2011, 132).
According to Hursthouse (2011, 133), the virtue of respectful love is 
helpful to understand why intervention in nature on behalf of animals is 
immoral. The interventionist thesis is a morally inappropriate conclusion 
deduced by theory-driven philosophers. Due to their commitment to some 
abstract, general and basic moral principles, these philosophers have no 
choice but to accept the interventionist thesis when it is deduced from 
those principles. But virtue ethics rejects the idea that morality is reducible 
to a set of abstract, general and basic moral principles which should be 
applied every time we try to solve a particular practical moral problem. 
Virtue ethics makes us think about the rights and wrongs of our treatment 
of animals in terms of virtues and vices, not in terms of some abstract basic 
moral principles. Based on these premises, Hursthouse holds that, from the 
perspective of virtue ethics, the interventionist thesis is just a manifestation 
of anthropocentric arrogance, an obvious example of unjustified paternal-
ism. When applied to wild animals, respectful love implies that we must 
respect the good that really is their own. Hursthouse acknowledges that the 
lives of the majority of wild animals are red in tooth and claw, but she con-
cludes that respectful love demands leaving wild animals to live their own 
form of life, even if that form of life is harmful for them. If we intervened in 
nature on behalf of animals, we would destroy their habitats and their own 
forms of life, something completely incompatible with respectful love.
As I see it, the main problems of the argument from virtue are clear. 
First of all, the argument is acceptable only if it is assumed the theoreti-
cal framework of virtue ethics. In the second place, even if we assumed a 
virtue ethics standpoint, it would not be as clear as Hursthouse thinks that 
we should repudiate the interventionist thesis. The vicious nature of the 
thesis is up for discussion. After all, virtue ethics has to face three common 
objections (Rowlands 2009, 100-1): (1) Subjectivity: one’s person virtue is 
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another person’s vice, and vice versa; (2) Vagueness: the implications of 
the application of a virtue in a particular case are imprecise and uncertain; 
and (3) Conflicts: there can be unsolvable and paralyzing conflicts between 
virtues. Of course, these problems do not disqualify virtue ethics as an 
adequate and stimulating approach to moral problems, but we must bear 
in mind that, many times, virtue-based theories come to different and even 
irreconcilable conclusions. This is not bad in itself, but it makes the vicious 
character of the interventionist thesis doubtful. For instance, we could 
argue that the interventionist principle is what the virtue of compassion 
requires in many circumstances, not an example of arrogant paternalism. 
Finally, I think the argument from species overlap is helpful once again. 
We would all probably consider virtuous helping a marginal human if he 
was attacked by a predator so, at least in principle, we should consider 
virtuous assisting animals in the wild as well.
4. concluSion
In this paper, I have assumed that sentient animals deserve the same (or 
at least similar) moral consideration as humans. Afterwards, I have argued 
that the eight main arguments against the interventionist thesis are ques-
tionable, concluding that there are no good arguments to reject our duty 
of intervening in nature to avoid unnecessary, avoidable and unjustified 
animal suffering (whenever doing so would not originate as much or more 
suffering than it would prevent). Accordingly, if the previous arguments are 
correct, a good theory of animal ethics must be one which openly embraces 
the interventionist thesis and the interventionist principle.
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